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Abstract
The EU trade policy is increasingly confronted with demands for more transparency. This article aims to investigate how
transparency takes shape in EU trade policy. First, we operationalize the concept of transparency along two dimensions: a
process dimension and an actor dimension. We then apply this framework to analysis of EU Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).
After analyzing transparency in relation to FTAs from the perspective of the institutional actors (Commission, Council and
Parliament), the different instruments and policies that grant the public actors (civil society and citizens) access to infor-
mation and documents about EU FTAs are explored by discussing Regulation 1049/2001, which provides for public access
to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, and the role of the European Ombudsman. The article is
based on an analysis of official documents, assessments in the academic literature and case-law of the Court of Justice of
the European Union. The ultimate aim is to assess current initiatives and identify relevant gaps in the EU’s transparency
policies. This article argues that the EU has made significant progress in fostering transparency in the negotiation phase of
FTAs, but less in the implementation phase.
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1. Introduction
Many policy areas and institutions have been confronted
by an increasing demand for transparency and access to
information in order to enhance legitimacy and account-
ability (Peters, 2016, p. 6). Transparency is often seen
as “part and parcel of a principle of democratic gover-
nance” (Bianchi, 2013, p. 4). This is also recognized in EU
law (Delimatsis, 2017) and EUpolicy-making (Hillebrandt,
Curtin, &Meijer, 2014). As a result, measures to enhance
transparency are introduced, including in relation to
trade policy. The previous European Commission’s Trade
for All strategy prioritized transparency initiatives, for
example by making public draft negotiation texts of Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs). Under the new von der Leyen
Commission, transparency in the EU’s trade policy will be
further strengthened: ‘Making trade more transparent’
is indeed identified as one of the key priorities for the
new Commission (von der Leyen, 2019).
This turn towards transparency has received
increased attention by researchers focusing on EU trade
policy and EU FTAs. First, some researchers focused on
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the consequences of increased transparency for EU trade
policy with a focus on accountability (Coremans, 2019a),
exchange of information and the inclusion of expertise
and knowledge in trade policy (Chalmers, 2013), the
inclusion of preferences in trade negotiations (Dür &
De Bièvre, 2007; Woll, 2009) and possible consequences
related to an increase of transaction costs (Coremans,
2019b). Second, researchers have focused on how trans-
parency plays out in trade policy from the perspective
of specific institutional actors such as the European
Parliament (EP—hereafter; Coremans&Meissner, 2018);
Council (Hillebrandt, 2017) and European Commission
(Coremans, 2017). Third, researchers focused on specif-
ic instruments to enhance transparency such as access
to documents legislation (Hillebrandt & Abazi, 2015)
and inter-institutional agreements (Rosén & Stie, 2017).
Here research focuses on the design of the agreements
and an assessment of their potential contribution to
enhance transparency. Fourth, researchers have ana-
lyzed specific trade agreements. The Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations between
the EU and the United States led to an unprecedent-
ed level of contestation of EU FTAs by CSOs and MEPs.
In addition to concerns about the agreement’s potential
negative impact on, inter alia, the governments’ right to
regulate and environmental, consumer and food safety
standards, many activists and social groups complained
about the ‘secrecy’ of the negotiations, implying that
the EU was negotiating behind closed doors without suf-
ficiently informing the public (Gheyle & De Ville, 2017;
Heldt, 2020) and the EP (Meissner, 2016). Finally, recent
debates around the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada brought
the role of national parliaments in EUmember states into
the picture as one mechanism to enhance transparency
(Wouters & Raube, 2018).
Our contribution builds on these approaches and
aims to make three contributions. First, we offer an inte-
grated analysis of the achievements of enhancing trans-
parency in EU trade policy along several dimensions.
Previous studies focused on very specific components
of transparency in EU trade policy and the making of
EU FTAs. Through a comprehensive assessment of trans-
parency measures in EU trade policy, we aim to identify
the areas where the most progress has been made and
where progress has been lacking. Secondly, we update
current developments with regard to institutional trans-
parency by covering the most recent case law of the
Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). Previous contributions
on institutional transparency focused on changes intro-
duced by the Lisbon Treaty and were to a degree spec-
ulative since they analyzed potential challenges. Several
years onward, recent case law allows us to better assess
the real challenges related to institutional transparen-
cy. Third, the integrated assessment and discussion of
recent case law leads us to develop the argument that
transparency increased with regard to the negotiations
of FTAs but less with regard to their implementation.
Based on existing literature and an in-depth analy-
sis of primary legal documents, we sketch the differ-
ent pathways in which transparency is operationalized
in current EU trade policy. In order to do this, we first
develop a framework to analyze transparency in EU
trade policy and next, for each component, we present
and discuss the main pathways in which transparency
is operationalized.
2. Framework for Comprehensive Assessment of
Transparency in Trade Policy
In order to provide for a comprehensive analysis of trans-
parency in EU FTAs we develop a framework along two
dimensions. Several authors have focused on conceptu-
ally disentangling transparency into different dimensions
and components (see, e.g., Coremans, 2017). For the pur-
pose of this article we distinguish two dimensions which
are especially relevant for analyzing EU trade policy: an
actor dimension and a process dimension.
The first dimension, the actor dimension, focuses
on the interactions between actors in a policymaking
or rule-making process such as the negotiation of trade
agreements. In Meijer’s (2013, p. 430) approach trans-
parency is defined as “the availability of information
about an actor that allows other actors to monitor the
workings of performance of the first actor.” The actors
in the context of the EU are manifold. On the one
hand there are the actors which are formally involved
in negotiating and implementing trade agreements: the
Commission, the Council and the Parliament. On the
other hand, there are the actors, or stakeholders, who
have a ‘stake’ or interest in trade policy for multiple rea-
sons. This implies that transparency needs to be created
between numerous actors. In this context Ostry (2004;
see also Coremans, 2019a) makes a distinction between
public and institutional transparency. Institutional trans-
parency focuses on information disclosure between insti-
tutional actors. Public transparency, in turn, focuses on
the relationship between external stakeholders, or ‘the
public,’ on the one hand and each of the EU institutions
(EP, Council and Commission) on the other hand. Such an
actor-based distinction is also proposed by Rosén (2018),
who focuses on the interactions between the executive
and public on the one hand and the executive and EP on
the other hand.
In exploring the institutional dimension of trans-
parency in EU trade policy, it is worthwhile to first reit-
erate some of the key components of the EU trade
policy-making process. Indeed, taking into account the
EU’s internal political structure and how the three main
governing institutions (the EP, the Council and the
Commission) interact with each other is crucial in assess-
ing transparency. Trade policy is an exclusive EU com-
petence (Article 207 of the TFEU), where the EU as
a single entity concludes trade agreements with third
countries and has the power to legislate on trade mat-
ters, whereas individual member states do not. The EU
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages 261–271 262
FTA-making process involves the interaction and partici-
pation of the different EU institutions at different stages.
The Commission requests authorization from the Council
to negotiate a trade agreement. Such authorization
includes ‘directives,’ which outline the mandate of what
the Commission should seek to achieve in the agreement.
The Commission then negotiates with the trading part-
ner on behalf of the EU. During this negotiation, the
Commission works closely with the Council’s trade policy
committee (TPC) and keeps the EP fully informed. It must
also hold meetings with representatives from CSOs and
publishes EU position papers, proposed agreement texts
and reports of the negotiations. Under the 2007 Treaty
of Lisbon, the EP is a co-legislator on trade and invest-
ment alongside the Council. International trade agree-
ments therefore require parliamentary approval before
they can enter into force. Once negotiations are com-
plete, the Commission publishes the agreement and pro-
poses the deal to the Council, who then needs decide
on its signature. After signature (together with the other
contracting parties), both the Council and the EP need
to approve the agreement in order to ratify the agree-
ment on behalf of the Union. During and after the negoti-
ations of an agreement, a set of procedures is set in place
throughwhich all institutional (three EU institutions) and
public (CSO) actors engage in information exchange.
The second dimension, the process dimension,
frames trade-policy as a process of negotiation and imple-
mentation (Abbott & Snidal, 2009). In this dimension,
there is a focus on transparency measures taken in the
different stages of negotiating and implementing a trade
agreement. This distinction corresponds to the distinc-
tion made by Auld and Gulbrandsen (2010) with regard
to procedural and outcome transparency and the distinc-
tion proposed byMartínez (2013) between documentary,
decision-making and operational transparency. In the
negotiation of trade agreements there are demands to
have access to negotiation mandates and documents
on developments in negotiations. Concerning implemen-
tation, there are demands for greater transparency in
terms of monitoring and fostering compliance with the
commitments laid down in a trade agreement.
In sum, for the purpose of this article, we approach
transparency as a set of rules and procedures on the
provision of relevant information to—and between—
institutional and public actors involved in the trade pro-
cess throughout the entire trade process (from nego-
tiating to implementing FTAs). In the next sections
we apply this framework to the different initiatives
geared towards enhancing transparency in EU trade pol-
icy. We divide the discussion on the actor dimension
and within each actor dimension we focus on the pro-
cess dimension.
3. Institutional Transparency
The discussion relating to transparency in FTA negotia-
tions revolves around the conditions under which the
EU institutions (and citizens) have access to negotiating
documents. The following section focuses on the con-
ditions, extent, and limits of such access to documents
throughout the entire process of EU FTAs for the EP and
the Council.
3.1. The EP
Transparency has been reinforced with the strength-
ening of the EP’s right to be informed following the
Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon brought three
crucial changes with regard to the role of the EP in
the EU’s trade policy (Devuyst, 2014; Kleinman, 2011;
Krajewski, 2012; Van den Putte, De Ville, & Orbie, 2014).
First, under Article 218(6)(a)(v) of the TFEU, the EP
obtained the right to give its consent to trade agree-
ments, as this is an area where the ordinary legisla-
tive procedure applies (Article 207(2)). Secondly, under
Article 218(10), it obtained the right to be ‘immediate-
ly and fully informed’ at all stages of the procedure of
negotiating and concluding (trade) agreements. Lastly,
the Parliament became co-legislator on trade legislation
under the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 207(2)).
The first two innovations are closely intertwined. As the
EP’s consent is required for the conclusion of EU FTAs,
it is crucial that the Parliament’s position and con-
cerns are known—and addressed—during the negoti-
ations to avoid the agreement being rejected by the
Parliament at the final stages of the EU’s ratification
process. On several occasions, the EP has already demon-
strated that it is not afraid to reject international agree-
ments in the final ratification stage, such as in the
case of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, the
SWIFT Agreement and the 2011 EU–Morocco Fisheries
Partnership Agreement.
In order to avoid such scenarios, Article 218(10)
of the TFEU states that the EP needs to be “imme-
diately and fully” informed at all stages of the pro-
cedure. Significantly, this right to information also
applies equally to international agreements for which
the Parliament only needs to be consulted or is not
involved during the ratification procedure (i.e., agree-
ments relating exclusively to the Common Foreign and
Security Policy; Articles 218(6)b and 218(6) of the TFEU;
Parliament v. Council (Mauritius), 2014). Moreover,
Article 207(3) of the TFEU specifies the information
requirement with regard to trade agreements by requir-
ing the Commission to “report regularly to [the Council’s
TPC] and to the European Parliament on the progress
of negotiations.’’
In 2010, the EP and Commission concluded an
Interinstitutional Framework Agreement (hereafter IFA)
that sought to strengthen the new ‘special partnership’
between Parliament and the Commission in the post-
Lisbon institutional framework by, inter alia, improving
the flow of information between the two institutions,
including in relation to international (trade) agreements
(IFA, 2010, Article 1).
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Concerning international agreements, this IFA pro-
vides that the Commission simultaneously needs to
inform the EP and the Council about its intention to
propose the start of negotiations, present draft negoti-
ating directives to the EP and to “take due account of
EuropeanParliament’s comments throughout the negoti-
ations” (IFA, 2016, Annex III). Moreover, the Commission
committed itself to keeping the EP regularly informed
about the progress of negotiations. In addition, the
Commission needs to show whether and how EP’s com-
ments were integrated in the texts under negotiation
(IFA, 2016, Annex III). In the case of international agree-
ments that require the EP’s consent, the Commission
also agreed to provide to the EP all relevant information
that it also provides to the Council during the negotia-
tions. This includes draft amendments to adopted nego-
tiating directives, draft negotiating texts, agreed articles,
the agreed date for initialing the agreement and the text
of the agreement to be initialed. This provision of infor-
mation from the Commission to the EP and Council also
includes any relevant documents received from third
parties, if these third parties agree with their disclo-
sure. Finally, the Commission granted the EP rights of
access to negotiation meetings by, for instance, facilitat-
ing conditional participation of MEPs (as observers) in
relevant meetings before and after negotiation sessions
(IFA, 2016, para. 25).
Hence, the IFA granted the EP unprecedented rights
of information and access to meetings of the Com-
mission (Devuyst, 2014; Kleinman, 2011). The Council
criticized this IFA between the Commission and EP since
it grants the EP access to confidential information. It is
therefore no surprise that the duty to inform, cod-
ified in Article 218(10) of the TFEU, led to a num-
ber of disputes, some of which ended up before the
Court of Justice. The EP notably initiated—and ultimate-
ly prevailed—in two cases brought against the Council
because of the failure of the latter to transmit relevant
documents, both concerning agreements on the trans-
fer of pirates with, respectively, Mauritius (Parliament
v. Council (Mauritius), 2014) and Tanzania (Parliament v.
Council, 2016).
In Parliament v. Council (Mauritius) (2014), the Court
ruled that the Council violated the information require-
ment under Article 218(10) of the TFEU by informing
the EP of a decision on signature over three months
after its publication in the Official Journal (Parliament v.
Council (Mauritius), 2014, para. 77–78). The Court con-
sidered the notification to the EP an essential procedu-
ral requirement within the meaning of the second para-
graph of Article 263 of the TFEU, the violation of which
leads to nullity of the decision (Parliament v. Council
(Mauritius), 2014, para. 80). In the Tanzania case, the
Courtwent a step further and clarified that the obligation
of Article 218(10) of the TFEU applies to any procedure
for concluding an international agreement (so not only,
for example, trade agreements, but even agreements
relating exclusively to the Common Foreign and Security
Policy; Parliament v. Council, 2016, para. 68). The Court
recalled that “participation by the EP in the legislative
process is the reflection, at Union level, of a fundamental
democratic principle that the people should participate
in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a
representative assembly” (Commission of the European
Communities v. Council of the European Communities,
1991, para. 20; European Parliament v. Council of the
European Union, 2012, para. 81; SA Roquette Frères v.
Council of the European Communities, 1980, para. 33).
As regards the procedure for negotiating and conclud-
ing international agreements, the Court argued that “the
information requirement laid down in Article 218(10) of
the TFEU is the expression of that democratic principle,
on which the European Union is founded” (Parliament v.
Council (Mauritius), 2014, para. 81). In particular, the aim
of the information requirement of Article 218(10) of the
TFEU is, inter alia:
To ensure that the [European] Parliament is in a
position to exercise democratic control over the
European Union’s external action and, more specif-
ically, to verify that the choice made of the legal
basis for a decision on the conclusion of an agree-
ment was made with due regard to the powers of
the [European] Parliament. (Parliament v. Council
(Mauritius), 2014, para. 71).
The Court further clarified that Article 218(10) of the
TFEU also extends to the stages that precede the con-
clusion of such an agreement, and covers, in particu-
lar, the negotiation phase which includes, inter alia, the
authorization to open negotiations, the definition of the
negotiating directives, and in some cases, the designa-
tion of a special committee, the completion of negoti-
ations, the authorization to sign the agreement where
necessary, and the decision on the provisional applica-
tion (Parliament v. Council (Mauritius), 2014, para. 75).
The Court found that the obligation to inform the
EP on the conduct of negotiations rests on the shoul-
ders of the Council (Parliament v. Council (Mauritius),
2014, para. 73). To the extent that this involves the trans-
mission of Council decisions, this is logical. However, it
has been questioned whether it is logical to make the
Council responsible for informing the EP of the negoti-
ations themselves, as the Council is normally not repre-
sented at negotiation sessions (Driessen, 2020). The TPC
are themselves debriefed some time (often weeks) after
negotiation rounds and are thus not in a position to
debrief the EP ‘immediately.’ In practice it is indeed the
Commission rather than the Council that debriefs the EP.
Following these cases, the three institutions agreed
to search for solutions on a tripartite basis. In the
interinstitutional agreement on better law-making of
2016, they acknowledged the importance of “ensuring
that each institution can exercise its rights and fulfil
its obligations enshrined in the Treaties as interpret-
ed by the Court of Justice” regarding the negotiation
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and conclusion of international agreements (IFA, 2016,
p. 1). The agreement on better law-making envisaged
special negotiations on improved practical arrangements
for cooperation and information sharing in the context
of international agreements (IFA, 2016, para. 41). These
arrangements are intended to consolidate the informa-
tion and scrutiny rights of the EP, so as to allow it to
ensure the democratic legitimacy of the decisional pro-
cess in the area of international agreements. However,
the negotiations on this delicate issue have stalled.
The analysis above illustrates that academic and pol-
icy discussions about the EP’s right of information with
regard to international (trade) agreements focused so
far mainly on the negotiation phase of EU trade agree-
ments, thus on the negotiation component of the pro-
cess dimension of transparency (as conceptualized in
this article). However, there is increasingly attention to
the (lack of) involvement of the EP in relation to the
implementation of trade agreements by common bodies
established by such agreements, thus on the implemen-
tation component of the process dimension of trans-
parency (Weiss, 2018). Whereas international agree-
ments concluded by the EU have always set up common
bodies to facilitate their own amendment and implemen-
tation, the new generation of EU FTAs makes use of such
bodies, often in the form of committees. These com-
mittees increasingly have extensive competences, includ-
ing legislative powers to amend the trade agreement, to
change the institutional architecture of the agreement,
to adopt regulatory decisions or to give binding inter-
pretation to provisions of the agreement. The EP is not
involved in decisions taken by the FTA bodies, as repre-
sentatives of the EP are not represented nor participate
in these bodies. Article 218(9) of the TFEU provides that
for significant amendments, the Council adopts the posi-
tion to be taken by the EU in a treaty body based on a pro-
posal by the Commission. For simplified amendments,
Article 218(7) of the TFEU provides for a simplified proce-
dure whereby an amendment is agreed to by a negotia-
tor, usually the Commission, acting under authorization
by the Council (Weiss, 2018). In both instances, the EP is
not involved in the decision-making of the Council deci-
sion. Contrary to the Council, the EP is not even consult-
ed by the Commission during the negotiations of such
decisions by joint bodies. It is only when the Commission
has agreed with the FTA partner the substance of the
decision to be adopted in the joint body/committee that
the Commission makes a proposal for a Council decision
on the position to be taken on behalf the EU in that
joint body, which includes the draft decision of the joint
body—and which is transmitted to the EP.
Significantly, decisions of such committees and joint
bodies may create new rules by way of their legisla-
tive and regulatory functions whose adoption internal-
ly in the EU would have required the involvement of
the EP under, for example, the ordinary legislative pro-
cedure. Therefore, the legitimacy of decisions of com-
mon bodies established by EU FTAs is questioned (Weiss,
2018), although it can be argued that the legitimacy
of committee decisions might ultimately stem from the
EP’s consent to the agreement, as this implies that the
EP agreed to the treaty-body decision-making mandates
provided therein.
It is not entirely clear to what extent the informa-
tion requirement under Article 218(10) of the TFEU
obliges the Council to inform the EP of—preparations
of—decisions of joint bodies under EU FTAs, as this
has not explicitly been addressed by the Court or the
IFA. Therefore, it has been argued that the information
requirements should be further specified and expand-
ed, for example by modifying the current IFA to give the
MEPs observer status in treaty bodies of EU FTAs, sim-
ilar to the status of observers part of the EU delega-
tion at international conferences, or to guarantee that
the EP receives complete and timely information at all
stages of the procedure with regard to envisaged treaty-
body decisions.
It is also important to note in this regard that where-
as the (draft) decisions of such joint FTA bodies are in
principle annexed to the Commission proposal for the
Article 218(9) of the TFEU Council decision, or are includ-
ed in the Council’s document register after adoption—
and are therefore accessible—the FTAs do not explicitly
require that such decisions have to be made public after
adoption by the joint body. Recent FTAs, however, aim to
make such decisions public. For example, the EU–Canada
CETA and the EU–Japan FTA do not explicitly oblige their
respective Joint Committees tomake public its decisions;
however, its Rules of Procedure (adopted as decisions of
the respective Joint Committees) specify that “the par-
ties to the agreement will ensure that the decisions, rec-
ommendations or interpretations adopted by the Joint
Committee are made public” (CETA, Article 26.3; CETA
Joint Committee, rule 10). The Rules of Procedure also
specify that the agenda and a (summary of) the minutes
of these meetings can be made public by the Parties,
unless one of the Parties submits that these documents
have to remain confidential (CETA, Article 26.4; CETA
Joint Committee, rule 9).
As noted above, the implementation component of
the process dimension of transparency also covers the
enforcement of FTAs. Similar to the situation of the
implementation of FTAs by joint bodies set up by such
agreements, the EP is hardly involved in enforcement
procedures. This can be illustrated by the State-to-State
dispute settlement mechanisms (DSMs) provided for
in the new generation of EU FTAs that deal with dis-
putes concerning the interpretation or application of
these agreements. Although such DSMs have become
standard practice in EU FTAs (Bercero, 2006), they are
hardly being used (European Commission, n.d.). The
Commission is representing the Union in these cases
(Council v. Commission (ITLOS), 2015) by requesting the
DSM consultations and eventually the establishment of
the arbitration panel and by representing the Union dur-
ing the arbitration proceedings. Significantly, there is no
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legal obligation on the Commission to inform or con-
sult the Parliament about the (potential) initiation of
such DSM procedures, or the legal position taken there-
in, although it is required to consult the Council. The
Court indeed stressed in the Tanzania case (Parliament
v. Council, 2016) that the information obligation under
Article 218(10) of the TFEU implies that the EP must be
informed at all the different negotiations stages leading
up to the entry into force of the agreement, but it did
not mention the implementation or enforcement of EU
FTAs (Parliament v. Council (Mauritius), 2014, para. 76).
Also, the IFA remains silent on this issue. However, in
practice the Commission (usually the Head of Unit on
Dispute Settlement) informs a delegation of the INTA
Committee every 6 months in camera about DSM pro-
ceedings under FTAs.
This does not mean that MEPs (or public actors such
as citizens or CSOs) have no access at all to relevant
documents about such arbitration proceedings. EU FTAs
require that the hearings of the arbitration panel are in
principle open to the public and that the parties make
their submissions publicly available. However, the arbi-
tration panel can meet in a closed session when the
submission and arguments of a party contain confiden-
tial business information. However, in this case a non-
confidential version of the submission needs to be made
public (CETA, Annex 29-A). Also, the final report must
be made publicly available (CETA, Article 29.10), but the
interim report can be confidential (CETA, Article 29.9).
Moreover, DSMs under EU FTAs allow CSOs to submit
amicus curiae briefs (CETA Annex 29-A).
The EP’s limited role in such DSM proceedings is
also visible in the selection procedure of the arbitrators.
The list of arbitrators is usually established by the Joint
Committee set up by the FTA. On the EU’s side, this
requires a Council Decision on the position to be tak-
en on behalf of the EU in that Committee, based on
Article 218(9) of the TFEU. As noted above, the EP is not
involved in this procedure, implying that the EP has, for
example, no means to check if the EU’s (proposed) arbi-
trators are meeting the necessary professional require-
ments (see, for example, CETA Article 29.8(2)).
3.2. The Council
Although the policy and academic discussions on trans-
parency with regard to EU FTAs mainly focus on the
right of information of the EP during the negotiation of
trade agreements, it is important to note that the Council
has also aimed to expand its right to information dur-
ing the negotiation of international (trade) agreements.
Article 218(4) of the TFEU provides that the Council
may address directives to the Commission as negotiator
and establish a committee which needs to be consult-
ed during the negotiations. With regard to trade agree-
ments, Article 207(4) of the TFEU stipulates that after the
Council has authorized the Commission to open negoti-
ations, the Commission needs to conduct these negoti-
ations in consultation with the TPC. The Commission is
required to regularly report to the TPC and to the EP on
the progress of negotiations.
In the gas emissions case (Commission v. Council (Gas
emissions), 2015), which concerned the negotiation of
an agreement with Australia on greenhouse gas emis-
sions trading schemes, the CJEU considered the rights
and obligations of an Article 218(4) of the TFEU commit-
tee. The Court ruled that the Commission is obliged to
provide the Article 218(4) of the TFEU committee with:
All the information necessary for it to monitor the
progress of the negotiations, such as, in particular, the
general aims announced and the positions taken by
the other parties throughout the negotiations. It is
only in this way that the special committee is in a posi-
tion to formulate opinions and advice relating to the
negotiations. (Commission v. Council (Gas emissions),
2015, para. 66)
The Commission can even be required to provide
such information to the Council (Commission v. Council
(Gas emissions), 2015, para. 67). Moreover, the Court
even accepted that the Council could impose procedu-
ral requirements with regard to information provision
and consultation between the established commit-
tee and the Commission in the negotiating directives
(Commission v. Council (Gas emissions), 2015, para. 78).
However, the Court also established limits to the
Council’s ability to direct the negotiation (Cremona,
2017). In particular, the Court held that neither the
Council nor Council Committees have the right to
establish detailed negotiating positions that bind the
Commission, as this would jeopardize the institution-
al balance laid down in the Treaties, would go beyond
the consultative function given to the committee by
Article 218(4) of the TFEU and would be an infringe-
ment of the Commission’s prerogatives as negotia-
tor (Commission v. Council (Gas emissions), 2015,
para. 89–90).
Less attention has been devoted to the Council’s right
of access to documents in the implementation phase
of international trade agreements. As noted above, the
Commission is in charge of the negotiation with the FTA
partner of decisions of joint committees established by
FTAs, and must then make a proposal for a Council deci-
sion regarding the position to be adopted on the EU’s
behalf in such joint bodies (Article 218(9) of the TFEU;
Van Elsuwege & Van der Loo, 2019). Only after the adop-
tion of the Article 218(9) of the TFEU decision by the
Council, the joint committee can adopt the actual deci-
sion. The Commission consults the Council in the TPC
about such negotiations before it adopts its proposal
for an Article 218(9) of the TFEU Council decision. The
Council is therefore in principle informed in a timelyman-
ner and consulted with regard to such Article 218(9) of
the TFEU decisions, however, it is not always immediate-
ly informed about the actual adoption of the decision of
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the joint committee (forwhich the Commission is respon-
sible). As noted above, such decisions are not always
made public—although recent EU FTAs make efforts in
this regard.
A similar procedure also applies with regard to
enforcement of EU FTAs by DSM cases. As confirmed
by the Court in Council v. Commission (ITLOS) (2015,
para. 86), in view of the principle of sincere cooperation,
the Commission is required to consult the Council before-
hand if it intends to express positions on behalf of the
EU before an international Court. The Commission there-
fore consults the Council in the TPC or in other Council
Committees before every step in such arbitration pro-
ceedings (e.g., request for consultations or the estab-
lishment of a panel). Moreover, representatives of the
member states are allowed to be present during theDSM
proceedings, but are not allowed to contribute.
In view of the above, it can be concluded that there
are sufficient procedures to ensure that the Council
is informed in a timely manner or consulted by the
Commission, both in relation to the implementation of
FTAs and the enforcement of FTAs.
4. Public Transparency
The following section analyzes the access to informa-
tion and transparency-related instruments and proce-
dures in the EU’s FTA policy involving public actors (i.e.,
civil society and citizens). The most important instru-
ments or procedures that give public actors information
about EU trade agreements are the access to documents
Regulation 1049/2001 (European Commission, 2019)
and the European Ombudsman.
4.1. The Access to Documents Regulation 1049/2001
Access to documents is, in the EU, governed by
Regulation 1049/2001 (hereinafter Regulation). This
Regulation builds on the principle of ‘widest possible
access,’ and has together with case law of the CJEU,
been instrumental in operationalizing the Treaty com-
mitments with regard to the right of citizen access to
documents and transparency. Any citizen of the Union,
and any natural or legal person residing or having its
registered office in a member state, has a general right
of access to documents of the institutions (i.e., the
EP, Council and the Commission), subject to the prin-
ciples, conditions and limits defined in the Regulation.
According to Article 4 of the Regulation, refusal of access
to a document can be allowed only in cases where
disclosure could undermine the protection of one of
the public (international relations and security) or pri-
vate (protection of personal data, commercial inter-
ests, court proceedings and legal advice) interests list-
ed in that provision. Exceptions to the general prin-
ciple of public access to documents should, following
established case-law, be interpreted and applied nar-
rowly (see Access Info Europe v. Commission, 2018a,
2018b; ClientEarth v. Commission, 2015). Hence, the
Regulation contains a mandatory exception to disclo-
sure of documents which would undermine the protec-
tion of the public interest as regards international rela-
tions (Article 4(1)(a)) third indent of the regulation) or
where disclosure would undermine, inter alia, court pro-
ceedings and legal advice, unless there is an overriding
public interest in disclosure (Article 4(2)). The Court has
acknowledged in several cases the wide margin of dis-
cretion held by the EU institutions in this framework
(Access Info Europe v. Commission, 2018b, para. 40–41;
ClientEarth v. European Commission, 2018, para. 23–24).
The General Court therefore concluded that the excep-
tion for the protection of international relations is there-
fore subject to a limited judicial review of legality that is
circumscribed to verifying the compliance with the pro-
cedural rules and the duty to state reasons, the accura-
cy of the statement of facts, and the lack of a manifest
error of assessment or a misuse of powers (ClientEarth v.
European Commission, 2018, para. 23).
Significantly, the Regulation has increasingly been
used, including by MEPs, to challenge Council and
Commission refusals to grant access to information dur-
ing negotiations of international (trade) agreements.
Two cases brought forward by MEP Sophie In’t Veld are
important in this context. In a first case, in 2009, In’t Veld
made a request for access to the opinion of the Council’s
Legal Service on the Commission’s recommendation to
the Council to start the SWIFT negotiations (concerning
banking data transfers to the United States via the SWIFT
network). Both the General Court and the CJEU in appeal
argued that the disclosure of the positions taken within
the EU institutions concerning the appropriate legal basis
for the agreement would not have posed a threat to the
EU’s international relations interests within the meaning
of Article 4(1)a of the Regulation (Council v. In’t Veld,
2014). On the other hand, both courts clarified the con-
tours of transparency in that they agreed that access can
be refused for documents that relate to the specific con-
tent of international agreements (this would arguably
include draft text and proposals by the EU) and the nego-
tiating directives which relate to the strategic objectives
pursued by the EU in the negotiations with a third coun-
try (Council v. In’t Veld, 2014, para. 58).
The second case concerned a Commission decision to
refuse access to certain documents relating to the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (In’t Veld v. Commission,
2013). The EP refused to give its consent to the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. The EP criticized the
Commission for a lack of transparency in the negotia-
tion process. The Commission only disclosed a limited
number of documents. Access to most documents was
refused with reference to the ‘international relations’
exception of the Regulation. The case was partially suc-
cessful for In’t Veld. However, the Court also recognized
the validity of the argument by the Commission that
the public disclosure of negotiating positions and nego-
tiations could compromise the EU’s negotiating position
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and undermine EU interests. Hence, according to the
Court, the negotiation of international agreements could
justify “a certain level of discretion to allow mutual
trust between negotiators and the development of a
free and effective discussion” (In’t Veld v. Commission,
2013, para. 119). Moreover, since negotiations are con-
ducted by the executive, public participation in the pro-
cess was “necessarily restricted” (In’t Veld v. Commission,
2013, para. 120). Finally, it was argued that the disclosure
of the EU’s position could “reveal, indirectly, [the posi-
tions] of other parties to the negotiations” (In’t Veld v.
Commission, 2013, para. 124).
It can be observed that in the area of FTA nego-
tiations most of the requests for documents under
the Regulation, including the related case law, deal
with the negotiation phase of the process dimen-
sion of transparency (European Commission, 2019).
The Court even clarified recently that, whilst acknowledg-
ing Commission’s need for space for deliberation on pol-
icy choices, documents drawn up in the context of an
impact assessment also fall under the general right to
access to documents (Case C-57/16). However, it seems
that the Regulation is hardly being used to request docu-
ments relating to the implementation phase of EU FTAs.
The Regulation could be applied to obtaining documents
relating to the positions taken by the EU in joint bodies
or committees or documents prepared in the context of
DSMs. So far, such an application has not been triggered.
As a result, the CJEU has not had the opportunity to clar-
ify the application of the Regulation in relation to docu-
ments relating to the implementation of EU FTAs.
4.2. The European Ombudsman and Transparency Cases
about EU FTAs
The European Ombudsman has become an important
player in the EU’s transparency framework. Around one
quarter of the inquiries the Ombudsman carries out
every year concern the lack of or refusal to provide infor-
mation. For example, concerns about transparency and
access to documents in the EU administration (mainly in
relation to the Commission) accounted for the biggest
proportion of the Ombudsman’s cases (24.6%) in 2018
(European Ombudsman, 2018). These statistics confirm
the significant increase in the number of new enquiries
observed since 2017, and reflect the growing importance
placed by the EuropeanOmbudsmanon this specific area
of activity (European Commission, 2019). Significantly,
the European Ombudsman is increasingly dealing with
transparency inquirieswith regard to the negotiation and
conclusion of FTAs, often initiated by NGOs.
One of the most significant inquiries in this area
was related, not surprisingly, to the TTIP. In July 2014,
the Ombudsman opened an investigation on her own
initiative into the transparency of the TTIP negotia-
tions, triggered by concerns about the non-disclosure
of key documents and the alleged granting of priv-
ileged access to a limited number of stakeholders
(European Ombudsman, 2015b). In closing this inquiry,
the Ombudsman welcomed the Commission’s trans-
parency initiatives launched in the context of the TTIP
negotiations, but also noted that they did not go far
enough to inform the public. She proposed the establish-
ment of a comprehensive list of TTIP-related documents,
including agendas and minutes of meetings with lobby-
ists (European Ombudsman, 2015a).
In addition, the Ombudsman carried out several oth-
er important inquires in which it called for more trans-
parency and access to documents with regard to the
negotiation of EU trade agreements, including recent-
ly in relation to briefing material (‘flash cards’) used by
the President of the European Commission in a meeting
with the President of the United States Donald Trump.
Whereas the Ombudsman generally favours stronger
transparency with regard to the negotiation of EU trade
agreements in line with the case law of the CJEU dis-
cussed above (Abazi & Adriaensen, 2017), in several
cases she concluded that the non-disclosure of sev-
eral negotiation documents was correct and justified
(European Ombudsman, 2018). It can again be observed
that, similar to the application of the Regulation, most of
the inquiries conducted by the Ombudsman concerning
access to FTA documents relate to the negotiation docu-
ments, and not to documents adopted in the context of
the implementation of FTAs.
5. Conclusion
Transparency has significantly increased in the EU’s trade
policy concerning FTAs. The focus has clearly been on
the negotiation phase of FTAs and less on the imple-
mentation phase. Of the institutional actors involved in
the EU FTAs, the Commission played the most important
role in this process, but the Council also, more reluctant-
ly, played a role, providing access to the EP and pub-
lic actors.
With regard to the institutional actors, we can
observe that the EP has secured and materialized its
right to be informed during the negotiation phase of
FTAs. The interinstitutional relations with the other two
internal actors have proven to be essential. Whereas
the Commission has been increasingly supportive and
cooperative with regard to the EP’s quest for more
access to FTA negotiation documents, the EP’s relations
with the Council on this issue remain difficult—as evi-
denced by the stalled negotiations on practical arrange-
ments for cooperation and information sharing in the
context of international agreements under the better
law-making agreement. Moreover, EP’s involvement—
and access to documents—remains limited in relation
to the implementation of EU FTAs. In particular, in rela-
tion to decisions adopted by joint FTA committees, the
EP’s access to documents—and therefore oversight—is
very limited. Considering the increasing importance of
such joint bodies in FTAs, it will be crucial that structural
interinstitutional procedures are established to keep the
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EP sufficiently in the loop. The renegotiation of the IFA
and the relaunching of the negotiations with the Council
on practical arrangements for cooperation and informa-
tion sharing in the context of international agreements
could open doors in this regard. Also, towards public
actors, transparency has been enhanced by increasing-
ly relying on the access to documents regulation and
inquiries by the European Ombudsman. It appears that
the access to documents regulation and inquiries by the
Ombudsman aremainly used to improve transparency in
relation to the negotiation dimension of FTAs.
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